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INTRODUCTION 
Potential radiological consequences that could result from terrorist acts are of great 
concern to both national security and public welfare, particularly for acts involving 
Radiological Dispersal Devices (RDD) or Improvised Nuclear Devices (IND). 
Accordingly, a series of relevant planning guidance documents has been developed by 
federal agencies, such as the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) through its 
authority under the Homeland Security Act of 2002, and are currently incorporated in 
the National Response Framework (NRF). While the initial planning effort has focused 
predominantly on protecting against or responding to activities related to the early (i.e., 
emergency) phase of an event for both first responders and the affected public 
populations, guidance on the late-phase recovery effort (i.e., activities leading to the 
eventual reoccupation of the contaminated areas) has not been adequately developed. 
One major consideration for developing such guidance is the need to encompass a 
potential array of seemingly limitless scenarios, ranging from a minor incident that 
causes only some “disruption” from an RDD, to a potentially severe incident causing 
“mass destruction,” such as the damage that could be caused by an IND.  
Regardless of the scenario, one common long-term concern is the potentially 
widespread radioactive contamination of either private or public property (particularly 
in highly populated metropolitan areas) that would require an extensive mitigation 
effort.1 Two major factors, among others, would likely weigh heavily in the decision-
making process: the large cost implications and the stakeholder acceptance of the 
cleanup goals, especially if a long time is required for site recovery.2 The challenge to 
develop suitable guidance for late-phase recovery efforts will therefore be influenced by 
these, as well as other, considerations in subsequent deliberations surrounding related 
issues.3 
A REVIEW OF HISTORICAL RADIOLOGICAL EVENTS  
Although there have been events involving the use of radioactive materials for malicious 
intent in recent history, they have been isolated incidents and few in number, and have 
had limited impact on society.4 It is thus useful to evaluate past radiological events that 
have caused significant releases, such as accidents involving nuclear facility operations 
or management of radioactive sources. Such events include accidents involving (1) 
nuclear power-generating facilities, (2) military and defense operations, and (3) 
radiation sources and transport.5 These events cover a wide spectrum in level of severity, 
ranging from limited environmental impacts or human trauma to significant casualties 
and environmental contamination. The lessons learned and experiences gained from 
past accident events can serve as valuable input in formulating a meaningful response to 
similar radiological issues in terrorist incidents involving RDD or IND.  
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Radiological events can cause varying degrees of harm to humans as well as the 
environment. To help characterize and communicate the significance of these events, 
the International Atomic Energy Agency, together with the Organization for 
Cooperation and Economic Development’s Nuclear Energy Agency, has published the 
international nuclear and radiological event scale (INES).6 The scale was designed to 
emulate such representations as the Richter or Celsius scales for earthquakes or 
temperature, respectively, and offer a better understanding of the magnitude of the 
potential impact. The INES scale comprises seven levels of severity (from low to high):  
Level 1, Anomaly;  
Level 2, Incident;  
Level 3, Serious Incident;  
Level 4, Accident with Local Consequences;  
Level 5, Accident with Wider Consequences;  
Level 6, Serious Accident; and  
Level 7, Major Accident.  
Events that are without safety significance are called “deviations” and are classified as 
Below Scale (or Level Zero). Three major descriptors are used to gauge severity for 
nuclear facilities: impact on people and environment, impact on radiological barriers 
and control, and impact on defense-in-depth (the latter two apply only to nuclear 
facilities). Accordingly, for any significant concern about radioactive release and 
subsequent contamination of the environment, the possible events would register a 
severity scale of at least Level 5 (i.e., releases that would require implementation of 
planned countermeasures) or beyond. Some of the more serious events (i.e., Level 5 
through 7) that attracted considerable attentions worldwide in recent history are the 
following. 
1. Accident at Three Mile Island Unit 2, Dauphin County, Pennsylvania, 
March 1979.7 Considered the worst accident ever in the U.S. commercial 
nuclear power industry, it released about 13 million curies of radioactive 
gases (i.e., relatively harmless noble gases) but only 20 curies of iodine-131 
(I-131) to the environment. Radioactive contamination was largely limited 
to the facility and its confines. It has been designated as an INES Level 5 
accident (accident with wider consequences).8 As a precautionary 
measure, pregnant women and preschool-age children within a five-mile 
radius of the Three Mile Island facility were advised to evacuate, and about 
140,000 residents voluntarily evacuated within days. Although the 
accident did not cause any significant impact on people and environment 
(only about one estimated long-term cancer fatality due to offsite 
releases), it did lead to significant damage to the reactor core. Since there 
was no contamination to public land as a result, the recovery activity was 
limited largely to the cleanup of the facility itself, which took several years 
and cost about U.S. $975 million. 
2. The Chernobyl Accident, Pripyat, Ukraine (Former Soviet Union) April 
1986.9 Likely the worst nuclear power plant accident in history worldwide, 
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the Chernobyl accident resulted in a widespread release of radioactive 
materials following a massive nuclear explosion that destroyed reactor 
Number 4. The accident released an estimated total of 380 million curies 
of radioactive material into the environment (including 49 million curies 
of I-131 and 2.3 million curies of Cesium-137 (Cs-137)).10 The accident led 
to fifty-six direct deaths (many of those were attributed to radiation 
exposure) and an estimated 4,000 long-term cancer deaths.11 An estimated 
336,000 people were evacuated within an extended “exclusion zone” of 
4,300 square kilometers.12 An estimated 2.6 million km2 of agricultural 
land was affected, with extensive contamination of the environment and 
the ecosystem.13 The release affected parts of the western former Soviet 
Union, Eastern Europe, Western Europe, North Europe, and also other 
parts of the world. Potential costs of the cleanup effort cannot be readily 
measured, although the initial estimate for Belarus alone in a thirty-year 
program to rehabilitate the affected areas was about U.S. $235 billion 
(thirty-two times the Ukraine’s annual budget at the time of the 
accident).14 As such, the accident has been characterized as INES Level 7 
(i.e., a major accident), because it resulted in “a major release of 
radioactive material with widespread health and environmental effects 
requiring implementation of planned and extended countermeasures.”15  
3. Cesium Source Accident, Goiania, Brazil, September 1987. 16  Perhaps the 
worst accident involving radioactive sources, this was the result of an 
inadvertent scavenging of a radioactive medical teletherapy (radiotherapy 
using external radiation beams) source (containing Cs-137) in an 
abandoned hospital. Since the accident was not recognized for several 
days, it was allowed to propagate further. It thus resulted in four deaths 
and injuries to several other people due to radiation exposure. In addition, 
part of the city was contaminated and required an extensive 
decontamination and remediation effort lasting several months, largely 
due to the lack of preparedness and specific guidance in responding to an 
unprecedented incident. A total of 1,200 curies of Cs-137 was accounted 
for in the contamination (out of a total of 1,375 curies in the original 
cesium chloride source), with an estimated contamination area reaching 1 
km2.17 Although the total final cost for the cleanup effort is not known, it is 
believed to be substantial. The accident has been designated as an INES 
Level 5 accident (accident with wider consequences).   
These examples also offer a useful glimpse into the potential severity levels for an RDD 
or IND incident, with a full blown RDD incident possibly at Level 5 (widespread 
contamination) and the IND incident at Level 6 or 7 (potential for causing major 
destruction). Of course, events of smaller scale could also occur and may result in only 
localized damage and have a more limited impact. However, regardless of the specific 
situation, each event would cause considerable disruption and possible trauma to the 
affected society in the short term, and present an expensive and long-lasting recovery 
challenge.  
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RESPONSE AND PROTECTIVE ACTIONS GUIDANCE 
Protective Actions and Guidelines 
In the United States, federal agencies have been planning responses to nuclear 
emergencies for decades.18 Historically the planning has focused primarily on 
emergencies involving accidental releases of radioactive materials, such as from nuclear 
power plants. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) first developed a Protective 
Actions Guide (PAG) manual in 1975. Following the Three Mile Island accident in 1979, 
President Carter issued an executive order establishing the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) as the lead agency coordinator for the nation’s 
radiological emergency response and preparedness. Under the arrangement, EPA was 
assigned the task of establishing PAGs for radiological response planning, and it issued 
the Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents 
with input from other federal agencies.19  
Following the terrorism acts of September 11, 2001, DHS was created by the 
Homeland Security Act of 2002, which consolidated twenty-two agencies (including 
FEMA) into one single federal agency. DHS has a threefold mission: to lead the unified 
national effort to secure America; to prevent and deter terrorist attacks and protect 
against and respond to threats and hazards to the nation; and to secure the nation’s 
borders while welcoming lawful immigrants, visitors, and trade.20 The Top Official 
(TOPOFF) exercise, also directed by Congress in response to the September 11, 2001 
terrorist attacks, was designed to strengthen the nation's capacity to prevent, protect 
against, respond to, and recover from large-scale terrorist attacks involving weapons of 
mass destruction (WMD).  
In response to this directive, DHS has conducted two exercises for attacks by RDD. In 
2003, the TOPOFF 2 exercise was conducted to simulate a terrorist attack involving an 
RDD in Seattle, Washington. In the TOPOFF 4 exercise of 2007, simulation of a full-
scale response to multifaceted threats was conducted – a coordinated attack in Oregon, 
Arizona, and the U.S. Territory of Guam. The TOPOFF 4 exercise was based on the 
National Planning Scenarios,21 designed for integrating federal, state and local partners 
in emergency planning (among the fifteen listed scenarios, Scenario 11 addresses a 
radiological attack by an RDD; the scenarios are now collapsed into a total of eight, with 
all chemical-related scenarios in one single core scenario, which is further differentiated 
by chemical agents in appropriate annexes per the Homeland Security Council). These 
exercises addressed policy and strategic issues involved in mobilizing prevention and 
response systems, and they challenged the ability of top officials to maintain a common 
set of operational goals during an incident of national significance. Following the 
TOPOFF exercises, the lessons learned were incorporated by DHS officials into the 
National Response Plan (NRP), which was later updated and then superseded by the 
current NRF in 2008. Both the NRP and the NRF were designed to provide guiding 
principles for a unified national response to disasters and emergencies.  
In an effort to provide guidance for responding to terrorist events involving RDD or 
IND, DHS established an interagency working group in 2003, the Consequence 
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Management, Site Restoration/Cleanup and Decontamination Subgroup (of the 
Working Group on RDD Preparedness) to address the need for unified federal guidance 
on RDD-related issues, with participation from eight other federal agencies. Following 
several years of deliberation, the guidance entitled Planning Guidance for Protection 
and Recovery Following Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) and Improvised 
Nuclear Device (IND) Incidents, was issued in 2008.22 The guidance provides PAG to 
support decisions on actions to be undertaken to protect the general public and 
emergency workers. The guidance includes information and regulations published by 
the EPA,23 which has incorporated relevant recommendations from the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA).  
The DHS PAG guidance on RDD and IND events generally follows the existing EPA 
PAG Manual for nuclear accidents. That is, the response is divided into three distinctive, 
yet somewhat overlapping, phases of an event. The early phase (or emergency phase) is 
the period at the beginning of the incident when immediate decisions for effective 
protective actions are required and when actual field measurement data are expected to 
be unavailable. It is generally associated with the initial plume passage and with short-
term exposures. Priority is given to provide lifesaving and first-aid actions to protect 
public health and welfare. Response measures include such actions as sheltering or 
evacuation of the public, as well as decontamination and administering prophylactic 
drugs. The period of this phase may last from hours to a few days.24  
The intermediate phase, which follows the early phase, is usually assumed to begin 
after the sources and releases are brought under control and field measurement data 
have become available for decision-making. The objective of the response is to prevent 
or avoid prolonged radiation exposure to the public. A high priority is given to such 
actions as restoring critical infrastructure or relocating the general public. The 
intermediate phase may last for weeks or months.25 
The late phase (or recovery phase), which follows the intermediate phase, represents 
the stage at which residual radiation levels from the event are reduced to acceptable 
levels, allowing a return to a state of normality, which may last for many years following 
the event occurrence. The PAG issued by DHS contain specific dose limits for response 
actions in both early and intermediate phases, but do not recommend specific dose 
limits for the late phase. Instead, the PAG recommends the late-phase cleanup be 
achieved through a “site-specific optimization process.” It states, “Because of the 
extremely broad range of potential impacts that may occur from RDD or IND…a pre-
established numerical cleanup guideline is not recommended as the best serving the 
needs of decision makers in the late phase.”26  
Scope of Response and Responsibility  
Responsibility for responding to RDD or IND incidents is currently specified under the 
NRF. The framework identifies the key response principles, as well as the roles of 
officials that organize responses ranging from local to regional to national levels.27 The 
scope and responsibilities of federal support are further prescribed under the 
Emergency Support Functions (ESF) within the NRF; fifteen support functions are 
established for all FEMA-managed incidents have been identified with responsible 
federal agencies (in collaboration with state and local governments cooperating with 
them): (1) transportation,; (2) communication; (3) public works and engineering; (4) 
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firefighting; (5) emergency management; (6) mass care, emergency assistance, housing, 
and human services; (7) logistics management and resource support; (8) public health 
and medical services; (9) search and rescue; (10) oil and hazardous materials response; 
(11) agriculture and natural resources; (12) energy; (13) public safety and security; (14) 
long-term community recovery; and (15) external affairs.  
For the late-phase recovery issues specifically, the primary responsibility for 
radiological cleanup falls under ESF no. 10 (oil and hazardous materials response) with 
EPA as the lead coordinating agency. For issues related to long-term cleanup, and 
depending on specific contamination situations, it is likely that the effort may also 
overlap other support functions that are led by other agencies (such as ESF 14 on long-
term recovery led by DHS/FEMA), which would entail close coordination among these 
agencies in a particular response. 
LATE-PHASE RECOVERY GUIDANCE AND CONSIDERATIONS 
Cleanup Guidance 
Late-phase recovery response has been recognized as an integral and important 
component of a national response to radiological incidents, but specific federal guidance 
has been lacking.28 The DHS PAG guidance of 2008 represents the first prescribed by a 
federal agency on events involving terrorism. However, as noted above, in lieu of a 
specific PAG (such as a predetermined dose criterion for cleanup), a process was 
prescribed for deriving a long-term cleanup plan. It involves a site-specific 
“optimization” process, intended to bring a balanced approach to determining the 
appropriate cleanup criteria for the contaminated area. One key reason that no specific 
level was recommended for late-phase recovery is that the potential impacts of RDD or 
IND incidents vary widely from minor to severe, so it would not be practical to use 
predetermined criteria for the cleanup and site restoration efforts.  
This is an important departure from the conventional statutory cleanup processes, 
which have established specific cleanup guidelines based either on radiation dose or 
health risk levels.29 Nevertheless, any criterion chosen from the optimization process 
will still include consideration of existing federal statutory requirements on 
environmental cleanup (such as the EPA Superfund Program and the U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission’s [NRC] rule on license termination), along with other national 
and international recommendations.30 The final cleanup will likely be decided by a host 
of relevant variables to be taken into consideration, such as the extent and type of 
contamination, human and environmental health protection, technological feasibility, 
and costs, among others. The deliberation on cleanup goals and criteria will be 
conducted by a designated Planning Section Unit under the emergency management 
structure by incorporating appropriate technical entities and stakeholders in the 
decision-making process.  
Discussed in the following section are the fundamental approach and key elements to 
be considered for developing the optimization process.  
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Optimization Process and Considerations 
For late-phase response (i.e., long-term cleanup), the guidance prescribes a process for 
deriving a long-term plan, in lieu of a predetermined cleanup level, in which site-specific 
situations are properly balanced. This approach entails a site-specific optimization 
process for determining the appropriate cleanup criteria for the contaminated area. For 
example, cleaning up an extensively contaminated urban area (as one might postulate 
for an RDD or IND event) would entail considerable complex deliberations compared to 
cleaning up a contaminated industrial site (as often encountered in EPA Superfund 
activities). Among other things, there would be an overwhelming desire for the affected 
community (both for businesses as well as the general public) to return to its normal 
routines following a radiological event (from a highly interrupted state due to initial 
evacuation or subsequent relocation). This effort would necessarily entail considerations 
far beyond the scope that is currently encompassed in the Superfund cleanup process. 
The cleanup process pertaining to the event would thus warrant more flexible 
considerations and would take the form of a multifaceted approach, that is, the 
optimization process. Compared to either early- or intermediate-phase responses, the 
decision makers would have more time to deliberate on the late-phase recovery issues.  
The primary goal of optimization is to establish societal objectives that include 
possible future land uses, cleanup options and approaches, technical feasibility, costs, 
cost-effectiveness, infrastructures, local economy, and ultimately public acceptance. For 
example, a small-scale incident (such as confined within a city block) may receive an 
expedited cleanup effort (using a simple, pre-determined approach), while an incident 
causing extensive contamination (e.g., affecting tens of city blocks in a major urban 
area) may warrant considerable effort (e.g., in terms of costs and time), thus influencing 
the decision on the final cleanup criteria.  
The optimization approach is also exemplified in the selection of appropriate 
decontamination technology. A recent report by the U.S. Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) cites the importance of developing guidance for identifying cleanup 
methods.31 The report pointed out that by not selecting appropriate cleanup technology, 
the decontamination effort may generate waste types that are more difficult to remove, 
thereby creating more wastes for disposal. For example, washing Cs-137-contaminated 
concrete walls with water may inadvertently enhance chemical affinity of the 
contaminant to the concrete surface, thus potentially increasing the quantity of waste 
generated (due to the need for additional decontamination efforts), in addition to 
creating secondary waste water streams. Or, applying chemical agents for 
decontamination may increase decontamination efficiency but also help generate mixed 
wastes (i.e., waste containing both hazardous chemicals and radioactive materials) that 
would increase costs for waste treatment and disposal. Thus a careful evaluation on the 
availability, effectiveness, and potential costs would necessarily entail a full 
understanding of the performance of a particular cleanup technology under 
consideration.  
The concept of optimization has been advocated by international and national 
regulatory and advisory bodies, and is also commonly practiced by all levels of 
government in decision-making processes. The International Commission on 
Radiological Protection (ICRP) has prescribed basic principles for protection against 
radiation.32 Of particular relevance is the fact that ICRP has advocated use of the 
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principle of optimization of protection, which maintains that the likelihood of exposure, 
the number of people exposed, and the magnitude of individual doses “…should all be 
kept as low as reasonably achievable, taking into account economic and societal factors.” 
This objective is commonly referred to as the ALARA (as low as reasonably achievable) 
Principle and has been affirmed by the National Council on Radiation Protection and 
Measurements (NCRP).33 The ALARA Principle has thus been a requirement in all 
existing regulations for control of radiation exposures, including the statutes on cleanup 
of nuclear facilities. A “graded” approach recommended by the Presidential-
Congressional Commission on Risk Assessment and Risk Management for 
environmental health risk management is also consistent with the optimization process 
and ALARA Principle.34 The graded approach is directly applicable to the highly varied 
situations that are both event- and site-specific in cases involving RDD or IND. 
Implementation of the cleanup decision thus requires input from all relevant 
stakeholders, taking into account a broad set of long-term objectives. 
Based on the above discussion, a number of areas have been identified as important 
for future development considerations. Such issues span from formulating applicable 
national policies, to advancing research and development in characterizing 
decontamination and cleanup technologies, improving understanding and ascertaining 
potential radiological impacts and implications, and finally, to developing effective 
decision-making processes and opportunities for stakeholder involvement. These are 
further discussed in the following sections. 
NEED FOR FURTHER DEVELOPMENT 
While the late-phase guidance developed by DHS offers a logical framework for the 
optimization process, it still lacks specificity and technical substance on how to reach 
cleanup decisions. In particular, given that the complexity of a cleanup is highly 
dependent on site-specific factors, several issues particularly critical to the decision-
making process require more in-depth consideration; for example, (1) how to 
characterize the governing cleanup principles, (2) how to factor in event conditions and 
other relevant parameters, (3) how to identify and prioritize options, and (4) how to 
achieve consensus between stakeholders and decision makers. A host of relevant issues 
need to be fully evaluated in order to facilitate decision making, ranging from policy 
assessments, to a basic scientific understanding of cleanup technologies and their 
limitations, to public relationships and communication.35 In fact, some of these 
problems have begun to surface in recent TOPOFF exercises.36  
Formulating Appropriate National Policies  
Although the scope and responsibility of the national response to events are well 
structured and prescribed under the NRF, individual policies that govern the operation 
of the responsible agencies in late-phase recovery have yet to be fully evaluated. The 
potential lack of coherent policies will likely hinder decision-making deliberations and 
therefore the efforts associated with site cleanup and restoration.37 Since we have little 
experience in addressing major radiological terrorism incidents, an evaluation of the 
relevancy and applicability of existing policies is warranted. Important issues are 
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property condemnation and economic assistance for the affected individuals and areas, 
waste storage and disposal, and recovery of critical infrastructure and facilities such as 
government buildings, major transportation arteries, and hospitals.38  
Two policies that need to be determined are disposal of the radioactive waste created 
during cleanup and the finality of cleanup objectives. With regard to radioactive waste 
disposal, decisions must be made about the disposal location and required acceptance 
criteria. Large volumes of very low-level contaminated radioactive waste (LLW) could be 
generated. Valuable lessons have been learned from past nuclear events, discussed 
earlier in this paper, where the decontamination activities involved mainly the removal 
of contaminated soils and dismantling of the houses that were deemed unsafe for 
dwelling. For example, in the event involving a cesium source in Goiania, Brazil (1987), 
the stored low-level waste (based on an ad hoc standard of 2 mSv/h dose rate) from the 
cleanup activities reached a total of 3,500 m3 (with a radioactive content of 1,375 Ci), 
which included contaminated soils, debris, and other materials.39 A temporary waste 
storage was used as a staging location (it was unclear where the waste was ultimately 
disposed of, as there was not an available disposal site at the time of the incident). 
This issue leads to consideration of expanding the current regulatory definition of 
LLW in the U.S. (substantially large amounts of LLW would be generated according to 
the current regulatory definition that contains no lower cut-off limits for radioactivity; 
in the Goiania case that limit was set at 2 nCi/g) and the possibility of using appropriate 
waste disposal sites (including existing commercial or government-owned radioactive 
disposal sites or alternative sites, such as local landfills for lower activity wastes).40  
Currently, there is an acute shortage of LLW disposal options in the nation. According to 
the Health Physics Society, “…the current shortfalls…are not attributable to any 
deficiencies in science or technology, but rather to the failure to garner the political 
resolve required to implement the Low-Level Waste Policy Act of 1980 (LLWPA)…as 
directed by Congress.”41 It would be prudent to identify and resolve such policy-related 
issues ahead of time. Toward this end, certain policies may need to be established in the 
process, including the possibility of invoking Presidential Executive Orders to expedite 
the disposal process (such as at DOE disposal facilities) as an emergency measure. Such 
policy issues warrant further deliberation and planning.  
With regard to the finality of the cleanup, it will be important to evaluate the cleanup 
requirements in existence now and to determine how to ensure that a site will not be 
subject to further cleanup actions in the future. An optimization process cannot be 
created without a comprehensive understanding and full resolution of these and other 
potential policy issues.  
Advancing Research and Development 
A large amount of experience and knowledge has been gained over the past few decades 
from cleanup activities conducted under various statutory requirements (including EPA 
Superfund cleanup activity, DOE efforts to remediate its former nuclear weapons 
complex, and NRC efforts to decommission its licensed facilities). However, as 
discussed earlier, significant differences do exist; thus the direct applicability of such 
experiences to RDD- or IND-related incidents must be thoroughly investigated.  
First on the list of concerns is the characterization of contamination. Current cleanup 
efforts tend to focus on alleviating the long-term contamination of groundwater (by 
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emphasizing the subsurface transport) due to existing conditions such as subsurface 
contamination. On the other hand, the situation in an RDD or IND incident would 
primarily involve aboveground contamination and subsequent transport in the 
environment. Because of the relatively high mobility of many contaminants, factors that 
could influence redistribution of contamination are ground-to-air resuspension, 
particle-size distributions, human disturbance, and adverse weather conditions (i.e., 
weather effects on the characteristics and transport of contaminants). Analysis of these 
factors will entail applications of, and possibly changes to, current models of 
contaminant dispersion in order to adequately characterize the possible exposure 
scenarios in RDD and IND incidents.  
Second, current knowledge of cleanup technology is generally limited to 
contamination of confined industrial areas, but not the wide-area contamination in a 
heavily populated metropolitan area that might occur in an RDD or IND incident. 
Examples for these specific applications do not exist today, as relevant events have not 
occurred. Yet one can get a glimpse of the potential magnitude of effort involved by 
examining the activities that have taken place following a major nuclear accident. In the 
case of the Chernobyl accident, for example, several different kinds of decontamination 
techniques were used.42 These included flushing of buildings and paving, digging up and 
removing of soils, plowing of fields, and chemically treating building materials. A 
comparison of the effectiveness of these techniques for urban settings reveals large 
variations.43 For example, while washing down the road (for dry deposition) was 
identified as being effective, the same technique was found to be ineffective for 
decontamination of building walls.  
The variations under these circumstances have yet to be fully researched, verified and 
documented. In the aforementioned GAO report,44 it was pointed out that current 
research efforts have focused mainly on predicting the effects of radiation release 
through simulation, small-scale testing, and theory, otherwise lacking full-scale field 
testing and verification. The report also calls for more research in developing 
standardized guidance for technology deployment and for cost-effective guidance on the 
efficacy and effectiveness of cleanup technology. The availability and applicability of 
such information needs to be well developed, compiled, and documented.  
Third, the basic understanding of the fate and transport of radionuclides in the 
environment must be strengthened, particularly with regard to the modern urban 
environment. Examples include the surface water runoff from rain or washing from 
decontamination activities into drinking water or sewage systems, and the development 
of effective containment and treatment downstream from the event. More research is 
needed to provide such information in predicting the movement of contaminants in an 
urban environment that would serve to guide an effective response in the recovery phase 
activities. As in the case of technology discussed above, current knowledge in this 
subject area has not been specific to urban settings. 
In summary, extensive scientific endeavors are needed to investigate the interrelated 
“real world” issues, rather than simply focusing on a single physical phenomenon. These 
efforts would include (1) tracking the movement of radionuclides in the environment 
(e.g., from the streets to transportation systems to the drinking water or sewage systems 
in an urban environment); (2) the continued propagation of such contamination beyond 
the area of deposition; and (3) the accumulation of radionuclides, such as those that 
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might be encountered in an urban environment and that must be removed prior to 
reoccupation. A well-developed body of technology that is specifically applicable to 
event situations in urban settings would greatly help in formulating a sound cleanup 
strategy and thereby facilitate rapid recovery.  
Improving Understanding of Potential Impacts and Implications  
The important decisions leading to a long-term cleanup strategy would necessarily be 
risk-informed and aimed at achieving optimization. According to DHS guidance, the 
optimization process should include “potential future land uses, technical feasibility, 
costs, cost-effectiveness, and public acceptability.” The DHS guidance further states that 
“Broadly speaking, optimization is a flexible, multi-attribute decision process that seeks 
to weigh many factors.”45 While many consider RDD as “weapons of mass disruption” 
(even if they lack significant destructive force, they have a great potential to spread 
radioactive contamination), the exact magnitude of their potential impacts on society 
has yet to be assessed with certainty because of the large variability in possible 
scenarios.46 The potential impacts of IND incidents are even less certain,47 although they 
would likely be of greater magnitude than those of RDD incidents, potentially causing 
some casualties as well as widespread, substantial, long-term contamination. Above all, 
inaccurate predictions of potential effects could adversely influence nuclear terrorism 
preparedness, leading to erroneous decisions.48  
Aside from the potential impacts on human health, emphasis must be placed on 
characterizing the potential economic losses and the possible recovery costs (relatively 
large costs may be involved if a key metropolitan district is affected)49  that an RDD or 
IND incident may inflict on society — a challenge for which a substantial DHS-
supported research effort has been undertaken and for which further assessments are 
still needed.50 Additionally, the potential psychological impact on society is another 
factor that has to be fully understood and characterized.51 Other impacts also remain 
uncertain, including future land use options, waste generation and disposal, available 
cleanup technologies and approaches, public acceptability, and potential coverage of 
cleanup costs through insurance policies held by private property owners.52   
The long-term cleanup would entail extensive input and evaluation in the context of 
optimizing site cleanup and restoration in the aftermath of an RDD or IND incident. 
Many of these issues are exemplified by, and have been manifested in, the major 
radiological accidents discussed earlier (specifically the radioactive source accident at 
Goiania and the reactor accident at Chernobyl).  
Past experiences and the lessons learned from them reinforce the fact that there is an 
urgent need to develop a sound technical basis for applying optimization processes in 
late-phase recovery from a major radiological or nuclear terrorism incident. Research 
should be continued and also further expanded in areas identified as critical to 
developing basis for decisions in the process that is described in the following section. 
Developing Effective Decision-Making Processes and 
Stakeholder Involvement 
It is important to recognize that the optimization process for cleanup following an RDD 
or IND incident would be fundamentally different from the more familiar processes 
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employed under the current statutory cleanup requirements. Superfund, for example, 
requires meeting a preset cleanup criterion or risk goal together with prescribed 
procedures (e.g., through the remedial investigation and feasibility study, together with 
five years of follow-up monitoring).53 Most of the Superfund sites are located in 
industrial or suburban areas. The optimization process, on the other hand, is designed 
to address a far more complex issue than cleanup, since its predominant objective is to 
achieve a timely restoration of the affected site to “normality” (a condition that allows 
government and its citizens to resume their daily routines) following the creation of a 
highly perturbed state, particularly in a heavily populated metropolitan area.  
Important considerations that must therefore be factored into optimized decision-
making processes are identifying and mitigating potential health risks, addressing 
public financial burdens, restoring key infrastructures, and resuming normal 
commercial activities, as well as balancing the roles and interests of affected 
stakeholders. However, society as a whole has little experience with such processes.54  
Clarification of, and stepwise guidance for, developing and applying optimization 
processes would be helpful and is clearly necessary. While existing cleanup guidance 
may serve as a convenient benchmark, different cleanup criteria may result from 
application of an optimization process. A decision on any cleanup approach, of course, 
must be weighed against the potentially large costs to be borne by society.  
Thus, achieving “optimization” requires a transparent approach backed by a sound 
rationale that satisfactorily reconciles the potential constraints in balancing acceptable 
health and environmental risk goals with the costs involved. The development of such 
an optimization process would be the key to implementing the PAG guidance 
recommended by DHS. Toward this end, one may view the existing statutory cleanup 
requirements as being an integral component of the overall optimization process, one 
that would only distinguish the event-related conditions from those unrelated to the 
events (such as Superfund) in a self-consistent deliberative process. Recent activities in 
the decision-making process for incident response may offer further information on this 
complex decision process.55 However, a systematic approach will be required to develop 
a comprehensive framework and a more instructive process with illustrative examples, 
together with a sound scientific basis and an extensive stakeholder engagement, to 
achieve the objective.  
SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
On the basis of these considerations, it appears that the current guidance issued by DHS 
presents a starting point for the long-term cleanup of sites contaminated by an RDD or 
IND incident. Nevertheless, further clarification and step-by-step procedural details are 
still required for both the development and implementation of optimization procedures 
for setting cleanup and site restoration goals. The most important issue to be addressed 
is identifying and defining the underlying elements for developing the principles and 
approaches in an optimization process to support the framework outlined by DHS. 
Further developmental work is required to support decision making, ranging from 
policy, to technical know-how, to impact assessments, to stakeholder interactions. For 
further input, some of the major issues should be vetted through a series of future 
emergency exercises designed to identify and resolve late-phase recovery objectives in 
CHEN AND TENFORDE, CLEAN—UP AND SITE RESTORATION 
 




order to obtain meaningful feedback from stakeholders.56 To this end, the effort should 
be devoted to developing a systematic approach that encompasses the following areas: 
(1) characterization of event scenarios, (2) development of viable alternatives, (3) 
decision framework and process, (4) technical basis and key parameter sensitivity, (5) 
stakeholder engagement and involvement, and (6) event- and site-specific 
considerations. The GAO has called for the development of a national disaster recovery 
strategy;57 the optimization process should become a centerpiece of that strategy.  
In recent years, national advisory bodies such as NCRP have devoted considerable 
effort to developing general guidance related to homeland security. NCRP, for example, 
has developed a considerable body of guidance on preparing for, and responding to, 
RDD and IND. This guidance includes NCRP Report No.138 (2001), Management of 
Terrorist Events Involving Radioactive Material;58 Commentary No. 19 (2005), Key 
Elements of Preparing Emergency Responders for Nuclear and Radiological 
Terrorism;59 and Commentary No. 20 (2007), Radiation Protection and Measurement 
Issues Related to Cargo Scanning with Accelerator-Produced High-Energy X Rays.60 
NCRP is currently preparing a report, Responding to Radiological and Nuclear 
Terrorism: A Guide for Decision Makers. Another report related to environmental 
remediation management is NCRP Report No.146 (2004), Approaches to Risk 
Management in Remediation of Radioactively Contaminated Sites.61 The wealth of 
such information forms an initial basis for formulating decision-making actions 
involving response to RDD- or IND-related events. However, further development of the 
framework and guidance is necessary, particularly regarding decisions facing the 
daunting tasks associated with the aftermath cleanup activities following such an event.              
Thus timely development of guidance on the late-phase optimization process as 
espoused by DHS is very much needed by society, preferably well before any 
unfortunate RDD or IND terrorism incident occurs. 
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